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The Need for a Comprehensive International
Foreign Bribery Compliance Program,
Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global
Anti-Bribery Environment
Jon Jordan*
ABSTRACT
It is no longer safe for companies to rely exclusively on their FCPA
compliance programs as a means for staying compliant with their foreign
bribery obligations throughout the world. Countries have committed
themselves to combating foreign bribery through international treaty
obligations and newer foreign bribery laws, such as the UK Bribery Act,
that have imposed tougher anti-bribery standards on companies operating
on an international basis. International enforcement of these foreign
bribery laws has also peaked in aggressiveness.
Companies need to tailor their FCPA compliance programs to adapt
their programs to the current international anti-bribery environment.
They need to look at current international guidance on anti-bribery
compliance programs and make their compliance programs truly
international foreign bribery compliance programs that can better protect
them in a world increasingly hostile to foreign bribery.
This article will explain the major laws and international treaties
governing foreign bribery and the need for effective compliance
procedures in an international anti-bribery environment. This article will
also explore some of the guidance provided by domestic and
international authorities on procedures that should be included in an
effective international foreign bribery compliance program. Finally, this
article will provide a list of minimum compliance procedures, covering

* Mr. Jordan is a Senior Investigations Counsel with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Unit of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Mr. Jordan has held
various positions in the SEC's Miami and Washington DC offices. The SEC, as a matter
of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its
employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Commission or any of the author's colleagues upon the staff of
the Commission.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:1

A to Z, which should be incorporated in any comprehensive international
foreign bribery compliance program.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 29, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Deutsche
Telekom AG, Europe's largest telecommunications company, and
Magyar Telekom, Deutsche Telekom's Hungarian unit and the largest
telecommunications provider in Hungary, with violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 1 The violations cost the companies at
least $95 million.2 The actions also added the companies to an
expanding list of major international companies that the United States
has pursued in its ongoing battle against foreign bribery. The battle is
intensifying.
The United States once stood as a lonely soldier in the fight against
foreign bribery through its enforcement of the FCPA, but now there
stands a platoon of international corruption fighters armed with modern
legal weaponry. This weaponry includes laws such as the new 2011 UK
Bribery Act.3 Enforcement of foreign bribery laws has also peaked in
aggressiveness unlike at any time before. The last few years have seen a

1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche
Telekom Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly
$64 Million in Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/magyar-telekomi/2011-12-29-mt-dtpress-release.pdf. The case involved the bribery of government and political party
officials in Macedonia and Montenegro for obtaining business and shutting out
competition in the telecommunications industry. See id; see also Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (dd), (ff), (m) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
2. Id. Magyar Telekom agreed to settle the charges by paying $59.6 million in
criminal penalties as part of a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and $31.2
million in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest to the SEC. Id. Magyar Telecom's
parent company, Deutsche Telekom, agreed to settle the charges by paying a $4.36
million penalty and by entering into a non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ. Id.; see
also Chad Bray, Deutsche Telekom Settles Charges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2011, at B2.
Magyar Telekom was charged for violations of the FCPA anti-bribery and accounting
provisions, while Deutsche Telekom was charged for violations of the FCPA accounting
provisions. Id.; see also infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
FCPA anti-bribery and accounting provisions).
3. See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.) [hereinafter UK Bribery Act], available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts20lO/plain/ukpga 20100023_en. The UK Bribery Act
took effect July 1, 2011, three months after the UK Ministry of Justice issued guidance
on compliance with the new law. See Press Release, UK Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act
Comes Into Force (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/briberyact-comes-into-force.htm.
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record number of enforcement actions by both the DOJ and SEC.4

Prosecutors overseas are also pursuing foreign bribery more diligently.
The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is vowing to enforce the new UK
Bribery Act aggressively.5 In addition, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) is pressuring signatory
countries to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD AntiBribery Convention") to prosecute corruption vigilantly under their
respective foreign bribery laws.6 Consequently, it is a dangerous time for
companies to be complacent about their foreign bribery obligations.
Even the slightest misstep by a non-compliant company may result in a
regulatory investigation.
With the increasingly dangerous and complex web of anti-bribery
laws through which companies need to navigate, where the pitfalls are
many and enforcers of the laws are tending to be more aggressive,
companies need to be cautious. What must companies do to avoid
trouble in this dangerous legal terrain? And will traditional FCPA
compliance programs be enough to protect companies operating under

foreign bribery regulations?
Today, it is no longer safe for companies to rely exclusively on their
FCPA compliance programs as a means for staying compliant with their
foreign bribery obligations. Instead, companies need to tailor their
FCPA compliance programs to the international anti-bribery laws that
apply to them. These programs must comply with the foreign bribery
requirements and laws of all relevant jurisdictions where the companies
do business. At first glance, this may seem like a daunting task.
Fortunately, international guidance exists-guidance beyond the
FCPA-that can help companies comply with international anti-bribery
laws. Such guidance includes the OECD's Good Practice Guidance on
Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance ("OECD Good Practice
4.

See, e.g., FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html
Enforcement

Actions,

FCPA

Cases,

U.S.

(last visited Aug. 9, 2012); SEC
SEC.

&

EXCH.

COMM'N,

http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2012).
5. See Jonathan Russell, The SF0 Needs a Big Scalp ifBribery Act is to be Feared,
THE TELEGRAPH (July 1, 2011, 5:45AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/

8609414/The-SFO-needs-a-big-scalp-if-Bribery-Act-is-to-be-feared.html.
6. See Press Release, OECD, OECD's Gurria Demands Stronger Enforcement in
Fight Against Corruption (Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Gurria Press Release]; OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999)
The OECD is an international
[hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
organization, consisting of 34 member countries, aimed at coordinating domestic and
international policies in furtherance of a better world economy. Information on the
OECD is available at http://www.oecd.org.
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Guidance"), 7 a set of international anti-bribery compliance procedures
released in February 2010 that has received the endorsement of multiple
international governments.
This article will explain the major laws and international treaties
governing foreign bribery and the need for effective compliance
procedures in an international anti-bribery environment. This article will
also explore some of the guidance provided by domestic and
international authorities on procedures that should be included in an
effective international foreign bribery compliance program. Finally, this
article will provide a list of minimum compliance procedures, covering
A to Z, which should be incorporated in any comprehensive international
foreign bribery compliance program.
II.

FOREIGN BRIBERY LAWS

There are multiple foreign bribery laws throughout the world that
prohibit the bribery of foreign officials. The relevant foreign bribery
laws can be divided into two different groups: (1) major foreign bribery
laws, such as the FCPA, that have been enacted by individual nations;
and (2) major foreign bribery treaties between nations, such as the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, which compel signatory nations to adopt laws
in conformity with their treaty obligations.
This article will not discuss every foreign or domestic law
prohibiting foreign bribery. Rather, this article aims to touch on relevant
major foreign bribery laws and treaties of which companies should be
aware. An understanding of these laws, and of the guidance that exists
concerning them, will provide support for the procedural safeguards that
companies should institute to stay compliant in a global anti-bribery
environment.
A.

Major ForeignBribery Laws

Two major foreign bribery laws stand out in the anti-bribery field.
One is the FCPA, the oldest and premier foreign bribery law that has
served as a template for other foreign bribery laws throughout the world.
The other is the UK Bribery Act, the newest foreign bribery law and one
of the most far-reaching.

7. OECD, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE ON INTERNAL CONTROLS, ETHICS, AND
COMPLIANCE (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE], available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf.
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The FCPA

The FCPA became law in 1977 and establishes civil and criminal
liability for the bribery of foreign government officials in order to obtain
or retain business. 8 The first foreign anti-bribery law of its kind, the
FCPA can be divided into accounting and anti-bribery prohibitions. 9
The FCPA's accounting provisions require issuers-companies that
have a class of securities registered with the SEC or that are required to
file reports with the SEC-to maintain certain recordkeeping standards
and internal accounting controls.' 0 The recordkeeping standard requires
that issuers "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
8. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (dd), (ff), (m) (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
The FCPA was created in response to a report issued by the SEC in 1976 finding that
many public companies had engaged in questionable payments overseas and had falsified
their accounting with respect to such payments in their books and records. See S. REP.
No. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 1-3 (1977); S. CoMM. ON BANKrNG
Hous. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 2-3

(Comm. Print 1976). The FCPA is both a civil and criminal statute, and part of it has
been incorporated into the federal securities laws. The DOJ is responsible for criminal
enforcement of the FCPA and civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against
non-issuers, and the SEC is responsible for civil enforcement of the accounting
provisions and for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers.
See Mike Koehler, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct in the Ultimate Year of its Decade
of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 395-96 (2010).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a), 78m(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The
FCPA was amended in 1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 to revise and clarify several of its provisions. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2006)) [hereinafter 1988 FCPA
Amendments]. The statute was again amended in 1998 to conform its provisions to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff
(2006)) [hereinafter 1998 FCPA Amendments].
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The FCPA applies to any
issuer that has a class of securities registered under Section 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") or that is required to file reports under Section
15(d) of the Exchange Act and to any officer, director, employee, or agent of such an
issuer or any stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2006 &
Supp. 2010). This provision would include certain foreign companies that list stock on a
U.S. securities exchange and their relevant personnel. Id. The relevant accounting
provisions can be found in Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, requiring issuers to
keep accurate books and records and to establish and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010). In addition, the SEC
has adopted two rules related to the accounting provisions. Rule 13b2-1 provides that
"[n]o person shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record
or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A)" of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1
(2012). Rule 13b2-2 prohibits a director or officer of an issuer from making or causing to
be made any materially false or misleading statement or omission in connection with any
audit. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2012).
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reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer."" The internal controls provision
requires that issuers create a system of internal accounting controls that
provide "reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in
accordance with management's general or specific authorization."' 2
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit bribery of foreign
government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business or
directing business to other persons. 13 Specifically, the FCPA anti-bribery
provisions prohibit: (1) any issuer, domestic concern, or person acting
within U.S. territory, or any officer, director, employee, agent, or
stockholder acting on behalf of any of the foregoing; (2) from using any
means or instrumentality of U.S commerce "corruptly" in furtherance of,
(3) an offer, payment, or promise to pay, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value; (4) to (a) any "foreign official," (b) any foreign
political party or party official, (c) any candidate for foreign political
office, (d) any public international organization official, or (e) any other
person while "knowing" that the payment or promise to pay will be given
to any of the foregoing; (5) for the purpose of (a) influencing any act or
decision of that person in his or her official capacity, (b) inducing that
person to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty,
(c) securing any improper advantage, or (d) inducing that person to use
his influence with a foreign government to affect or influence any
government act or decision; (6) in order to assist such issuer, domestic
concern, or person acting within U.S. territory, in obtaining or retaining

11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The term "reasonable detail" is
defined as "such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials
in the conduct of their own affairs." 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(7) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The provision specifically
requires that issuers
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions are executed in accordance
with management's general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are
recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and (I) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets
is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate
action is taken with respect to any differences.
Id. Civil liability will be found with respect to violations of the accounting provisions,
and criminal liability will also be found under the accounting provisions when a person
"knowingly" circumvents or fails to implement a system of internal accounting controls
or "knowingly" falsifies the books and records. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2), (5) (2006 &
Supp. 2010).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
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business, or directing business to any person. 14 As noted above, the anti'5
bribery provisions apply to any issuer and to any "domestic concern.'
The FCPA defines a domestic concern as any citizen, national, or
resident of the United States, and any corporation, partnership, or
association which has its principal place of business
in the United States
16
or which is incorporated in the United States.
There are two affirmative defenses to the FCPA anti-bribery
provisions.17 The first defense applies when the payment at issue is
18
lawful under the written laws of a relevant foreign official's country.
The second defense allows for payments that are considered "reasonable
and bona fide" expenditures, "such as travel and lodging expenses,"
incurred by foreign officials directly related to "promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services," or "execution or
performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency."' 19 In
addition to these two defenses, there is an exception allowing for
"facilitation" or "grease payments" to foreign officials for the purposes
of expediting or securing the performance of "routine
government
20
action(s)," such as the processing of immigration visas.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010). There is both criminal
and civil liability for violations of the anti-bribery provisions, and the provisions have
been incorporated into the federal securities laws at Section 30A of the Exchange Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The term "foreign official" means
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public
international organization.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(l)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010). Issuers
subject to the anti-bribery provisions are the same as the relevant issuers subject to the
accounting provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010). See also supra note
11 and accompanying discussion.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -2(h)(1), -3(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1)(2), -2(c)(1)(2), -3(c)(1)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
"[R]outine
government action" means any action that is ordinarily performed by a foreign official,
such as obtaining permits, processing visas, and lining up basic services. 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-l(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010). Specifically, the FCPA
defines "routine government action" as "an action which is ordinarily and commonly
performed by a foreign official in (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official
documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing
government papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail
pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across the country; (iv) providing phone service,
power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products
or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature." Id. Payments
made to expedite any of the basic services listed above or "of a similar nature" are not
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2.

UK Bribery Act

Another major foreign bribery law is the UK Bribery Act. The UK
Bribery Act (effective July 2011),21 criminalizes bribery of foreign
officials, bribery of domestic government officials, commercial bribery,
receipt of a bribe, and failure of corporations to prevent bribery.22
With respect to foreign bribery, Section 6 of the UK Bribery Act
makes it a crime for a person to bribe a foreign public official with the
intent to obtain or retain business or a business advantage.23 To violate
Section 6, the person making the bribe must have directly or through a
third party offered, promised, or given a bribe to a foreign public official,
or to another person at the foreign public official's request, assent, or
acquiescence. 24 The anti-bribery provisions apply to United Kingdom
companies, citizens, and residents-regardless of where the bribery
occurred-and to individuals or companies, irrespective of nationality,
when the relevant violations occur within the United Kingdom.2 5
The UK Bribery Act also establishes criminal liability for
corporations that fail to prevent bribery. 6 Specifically, Section 7 states
considered payments prohibited by the FCPA. Id. The facilitation payments exception is
an exception only to the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and is not an exception to the
accounting provisions. See Lucinda A. Low et al., Enforcement of the FCPA in the
United States: Trends and the Effects of InternationalStandards, 1665 PLI/CoRP 711,
725 (2008). Issuers will be liable under the accounting provisions if they make
facilitation payments without properly recording such payments in their books and
records. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
21. See UK Bribery Act, supra note 3.
22. See UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, §§ 1-7. Individuals who violate the UK
Bribery Act face imprisonment for up to ten years, and individuals and corporations who
violate the law face getting penalized with a fine for an unlimited amount. Id. § 11(1)(3). The UK Bribery Act replaced various laws concerning bribery under the common
law and the prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
EXPLANATORY

MEMORANDUM

TO

THE

BRIBERY

ACT

2010

(CONSEQUENTIAL

AMENDMENTS), 2011 No. 1441, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/20l1/
1441/pdfs/uksiem 20111441 en.pdf.
23. See UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, § 6(1)-(2). Section 6(5) of the UK Bribery
Act defines a "foreign public official" as any individual who
(a) holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, whether
appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom...
[or] (b) exercises a public function--(i) for or on behalf of a country or territory
outside the United Kingdom . . . or (ii) for any public agency or public

enterprise of that country or territory... or (c) is an official or agent of a public
international organization.
Id. § 6(5).
24. See id. § 6(3). This section also requires that the relevant law governing the
foreign public official not permit him to be influenced by the payment of a bribe. Id. A
senior officer of a corporation is guilty under the law when his corporation violates the
law with his "consent or connivance." Id. § 14.
25. See UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, § 12(1), (4).
26. See id. § 7.
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that a commercial organization violates the law when a person
"associated" with the organization "bribes another person intending to
obtain or retain business" or a "business advantage" for the
organization. 27 Section 7 is remarkable in that its extraterritorial reach
extends to any commercial organization incorporated in the United
Kingdom and to any commercial organization, wherever incorporated,
"which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the
United Kingdom., 28 Thus, United Kingdom courts can hold accountable
international corporations that do any kind of business in the United
Kingdom under the failure to prevent bribery provision.29
The UK Bribery Act also provides an "adequate procedures"
defense to liability under Section 7.30 That is, the UK Bribery Act
provides commercial organizations with a defense to liability under the
failure to prevent bribery provision when organizations can "prove" that
they "had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons
31
associated" with them from "undertaking" in the violative conduct.
B.

Major Foreign Bribery Treaties

In addition to the relevant foreign bribery laws of individual
countries, one should consider international treaties concerning foreign
bribery. These treaties obligate signatory parties to enact laws designed
to prevent foreign bribery in accordance with the treaties' provisions.
These treaties represent the relevant foreign bribery laws of the
27. Id. An "associated" person can be any person who "performs services for or on
behalf' of a commercial organization and includes any "employee, agent or subsidiary"
of the organization. Id.§ 8(1). The "capacity" in which a person "performs services for
or on behalf' of a commercial organization "does not matter" and that person may be an
"employee, agent or subsidiary" of the commercial organization. Id. § 8(2)-(3).
28. Id. § 7(5). Section 7(5) states that a "relevant commercial organisation" within
the meaning of this provision is
(a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), (b) any
other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom, (c) a partnership which is
formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a
business (whether there or elsewhere), or (d) any other partnership (wherever
formed) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the
United Kingdom.
Id; see also id. § 12(5)-(6). This extraterritorial reach is far broader than that of the
FCPA. It is uncertain how the Serious Fraud Office, the primary enforcer of the UK
Bribery Act, will enforce the law and whether United Kingdom courts will uphold it. See
Eric Engle, I Get By with a Little Help from my Friends? Understandingthe U.K. AntiBribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 44 INT'L LAW. 1173, 1183 (2011).
29. See UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, § 7(5).
30. Id.§ 7(2).
31. Id.
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international
regional unions and countries that are parties to the
32
treaties.
1.

Inter-American Convention Against Corruption

The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption ("InterAmerican Convention") is the first international treaty to directly address
foreign bribery.33 Passed in 1996 by the Organization of American
States (OAS), the Inter-American Convention treaty commits the United
States and other OAS member states in the Western Hemisphere to
criminalize certain acts of corruption, establishes a set of measures
designed to prevent foreign bribery, and strengthens cooperation between
OAS member states in the fight against bribery.34
The Inter-American Convention treaty consists of 28 articles. The
35
relevant anti-bribery provisions are contained in Articles VI and VIII.
32. For example, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention applies to OECD member and
signatory countries and requires such countries to conform their foreign bribery laws to
their treaty obligations. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. When
the OECD's Working Group on Bribery criticized the United Kingdom's anti-bribery
laws for not being satisfactory in light of the country's obligations under the OECD AntiBribery Convention, the United Kingdom modernized its foreign bribery laws through
the UK Bribery Act. See OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2B1s, REPORT ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS

IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE

1997

RECOMMENDATION ON

COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf, see also F. Joseph Warin et al., The
British are Coming!: Britain Changes its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the
InternationalFight against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 4-5 (2010).
33. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention], available at http:/www.oas.org/juridico/
English/treaties/b-58.html. The 34 member states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) at the time approved the Inter-American Convention at a third plenary session
held on March 29, 1996. Id. The OAS is a regional organization currently comprised of
35 countries in the Western Hemisphere and was established to achieve among the
member countries "an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to
strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity,
and their independence."
Who We Are, ORG. OF AM. STATES, available at
http://www.oas.org/en/about/whoweare.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2012) (discussing
goals of the OAS as stipulated in Article 1 of its Charter).
34. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 33. The United States Senate
approved the Convention on July 27, 2000, and President Clinton ratified it on September
15, 2000. See Press Release, Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, U.S.
Dep't of State Office of the Spokesman, Senate Ratification of the OAS Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption (Aug. 1, 2000). In ratifying the Convention, President
Clinton stated that the "[c]onvention was the first multilateral agreement against bribery
to be adopted anywhere in the world" and that its adoption was a "victory for good
government, fair competition, and open trade throughout [the Western] Hemisphere."
Clinton Statement on Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Sep. 16, 2000.
35. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 33, arts. VI, VIII.
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Article VI defines "acts of corruption" that signatories are required to
criminalize and includes the solicitation or acceptance of bribes by
government officials, the offering or granting of bribes to government
officials, and improper acts or omissions by government officials in
response to bribes.36 Article VIII applies to foreign bribery and requires
signatory countries to prohibit the offering and granting of bribes to
The Inter-American Convention is significant
foreign officials. 37
because it is the first multilateral treaty to address foreign bribery and

applies to most countries in the Western Hemisphere.38
2.

OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

One of the most important foreign bribery treaties is the OECD
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Anti-Bribery Convention. 39
resulted from efforts by the United States to push for an international
treaty, similar to the FCPA, which would prevent foreign bribery on an
The OECD adopted the OECD Anti-Bribery
international scale. 40
Convention in 1997.41

36. Id art. VI. Such "acts" also include the fraudulent use or concealment of
property derived from any of the wrongful acts and bribes, and conspiracy. Id. Under
Article VII of the Inter-American Convention, OAS members "that have not yet done so
shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures" necessary to "establish as
criminal offenses under their domestic law[s] the acts of corruption" described under
Article VI. Id. art. VII.
37. See id. art. VIII. Specifically, Article VIII obligates signatory countries to
prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its
nationals, persons having their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses
domiciled there, to a government official of another state, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise of advantage, in
connection with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any
act or omission in the performance of that official's public functions.
Id.
38. See Giorleny D. Altamirano, The Impact of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption,38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 487, 489, 499 (2006-2007). Indeed,
up until the time of the enactment of the Inter-American Convention, the FCPA "stood
alone" as a law designed to prevent foreign bribery. See Lucinda A. Low et al., The
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption:A Comparison with the United States
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 243, 245 (1998).

39. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6.
40. In the early days of the FCPA, many business owners complained that the U.S.
statute had placed them at a disadvantage compared to their foreign competitors because
they could no longer pay bribes necessary to secure lucrative government contracts that
their foreign counterparts could. See Charles B. Weinograd, Clarifying Grease:
Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine
Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J.INT'L L. 509, 517 (2010).

Some domestic

businesses also complained that the U.S. statute reduced profits. See Alexandros Zervos,
Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing the Exemption for "Routine
Government Action" Payments, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 251, 256 (2006). Congress

responded to these complaints through the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, calling on the
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The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires signatory countries to
enact laws designed to criminalize bribery of foreign officials.42
Specifically, Article 1 requires signatory countries to make it a crime
for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a
third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or
retain business or other
improper advantage in the conduct of
43
international business.
Article 1 also states that each signatory country shall "establish that
complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorization
of an act of bribery of a foreign public official" will be a criminal
offense. 44 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is significant in that it
has been signed and ratified by the world's leading business and trading
nations. 45 As such, it reflects the foreign bribery obligations and laws of

U.S. government to pursue an international foreign bribery treaty through the OECD to
level the playing field between domestic and foreign companies. See 1988 FCPA
Amendments, supra note 9, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424.
41. See H. REP. No. 105-802, at 13 (1998); OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
supra note 6. The Convention was signed on December 17, 1997, entering into force on
February 15, 1999. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_ 34859_2057484_1 11_1,
00.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
42. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supranote 6.
43. Id. art. 1.
44. Id. It is worth noting that, like the FCPA, but unlike most international foreign
bribery laws, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention provides for an exception for "small"
facilitation payments. See id. at cmt. 9. Nevertheless, the OECD has recently called for
an end to facilitation payments even though the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention still
contains language allowing for "small" facilitation payments. Specifically, in 2009, the
OECD established its Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Officials, which, among other things, called on signatory nations to the OECD AntiBribery Convention to end the permissibility of "corrosive" facilitation payments. See
OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUB. OFFICIALS IN INT'L Bus.
TRANSACTIONS, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR FURTHER COMBATING BRIBERY
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, at 4 (Nov. 26,

2009) (amended Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter OECD RECOMMENDATION]. For a more
comprehensive discussion on the history of the facilitation payments exception under the
FCPA and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the recent OECD call for an end to such
payments, see Jon Jordan, The OECD's Call for an End to "Corrosive" Facilitation
Payments and the InternationalFocus on the FacilitationPayments Exception under the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881, 911-19 (2011).
45. See OECD, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC TRANSACTIONS, RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF APRIL

2012, available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/antiThe treaty has been signed and ratified by 39
briberyconvention/40272933.pdf.
countries, consisting of all 34 OECD member countries and 5 other countries outside of
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the nations that govern the majority of the international commercial
marketplace. 46

United Nations Convention Against Corruption

3.

Another major international treaty dealing with foreign bribery is
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption ("United Nations
Convention").47 The United Nations Convention, adopted in October
2003,

is

comprised

of provisions

covering

the

prevention

and

criminalization of corruption, cooperation in the fight against corruption,
and the recovery of assets obtained through corruption. 8 With respect to
foreign bribery, Article 16.1 of the United Nations Convention requires
signatory countries to adopt laws designed to prohibit the bribery of

foreign public officials and officials of public international
organizations. 49 In addition, like the Inter-American Convention, the
the OECD who also agreed to sign the treaty (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Russian
Federation, and South Africa). Id.
46. See Lisa Miller, No More 'This for That'? The Effect of the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 140 (2000).
47. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc.
A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
[hereinafter
United
Nations
UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf
Convention]. The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945 after
World War II that currently consists of 193 member countries. See UN at a Glance,
UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited
Aug. 11, 2012). The United Nation's main purposes are to ensure peace in the world;
develop friendly relations between countries; help countries fight hunger, disease, and
illiteracy; and to act as a central organization for the achievement of these goals. Id.; see
also U.N. Charter art. 1, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/
uncharter.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
48.

See United Nations Convention, supra note 47, art. 1-59; see also United

Nations Convention Against Corruption,Convention Highlights, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
ON

DRUGS

&

CRIME,

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/convention-

highlights.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2012). There are currently 140 signatories to the
treaty and 160 parties to it. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNCA C
Signature andRatification Status as of 12 March 2012, UNITED NAT'L OFFICE ON DRUGS
& CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited
Aug. 11, 2012). The United States signed the United Nations Convention on December
9, 2003, and ratified the treaty on October 30, 2006. Id.
49. See United Nations Convention, supra note 47, art. 16. Specifically, Article 16.1
of the treaty provides that
[elach State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the
promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public
international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to
obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of
international business.
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United Nations Convention addresses the demand side of foreign bribery
and requires that signatory countries adopt laws to prohibit the
solicitation or acceptance of bribes by foreign public officials and
officials of public international organizations.5 0 The United Nations
Convention is significant because it is a major foreign bribery treaty
adopted by the United Nations, the largest international organization in
the world.51
4.

African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption

The most recent international treaty designed to prevent foreign
bribery is the African Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption ("African Convention").52 The African Convention entered
into force on August 5, 2006, and has been ratified by 33 of 53 countries
in the African Union.53 The African Convention is similar to the United
Nations Convention in that it compels signatory members to enact laws
preventing and criminalizing corruption and to cooperate with each other
in the fight against bribery. 4
Id.
50. See id art. 16.2.; Inter-American Convention, supra note 33, art. VI; see also
supra text accompanying note 36. Article 16.2 provides that
[elach State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an
official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her
official duties.
United Nations Convention, supra note 47, art. 16.2.
51. See United Nations Convention, supra note 47, art. 16.2. Nevertheless, there has
been some criticism that the United Nations Convention suffers from certain fundamental
weaknesses that make it a weaker treaty than it otherwise might have been. See Philippa
Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Global Achievement or
Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 191 (2005).
52. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Jul. 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter African Convention], available at http://www.africa
union.org/official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention%20
on%20Combating%2OCorruption.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
53. AFRICAN UNION, LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SIGNED, RATIFIED/ACCEDED TO
THE AFRICAN CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING CORRUPTION (2012),
available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/corruption.pdf. The African Union
currently consists of 54 member states.
See Member States, AFRICAN UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/member states/countryprofiles (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). The
goals of the African Union are "[t]o achieve greater unity and solidarity" between
African member states and to "accelerate the political and socio-economic integration" of
the African continent. See AU in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.au.int/en/
about/nutshell (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
54. See African Convention, supra note 52; see also supra text accompanying note
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With respect to foreign bribery, Article 4 defines one of the acts of

corruption as
the solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public
official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other
benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or
herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for55any act or
omission in the performance of his or her public function.

Another relevant act of corruption under Article 4 is
the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or
any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit,
such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or
any act or omission in
for another person or entity, in exchange for 56
the performance of his or her public functions.
The African Convention is important because it is the most recent
international treaty governing foreign bribery. It is also significant
because it involves some of the most under-developed and corrupt

countries in the world.57
III.

THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES IN AN
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY ENVIRONMENT

Instituting and implementing an effective compliance program
containing procedures applicable on an international scale will assist
companies in preventing bribery and avoiding liability when operating
on an international basis. Such measures will also allow companies to
mitigate-and possibly avoid-liability should foreign bribery happen
within their operations.

55. African Convention, supra note 52, art. 4.1(a). Article 5 of the African
Convention requires state parties to "adopt legislative and other measures" designed to
make criminal certain acts of corruption as spelled out in Article 4. Id. art. 5.1.
56. Idart.4.1.(b).
57. See Lucky Bryce Jatto, Africa's Approach to the International War on
Corruption: A CriticalAppraisal of the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, 10 ASPER REv. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 79, 80 (2010). According
to Transparency International's 2011 "Corruptions Perception Index," an index that rates
countries based on how corrupt people perceive them to be, eight African Union member
countries rank among the top ten percent of the most corrupt countries in the world. See
Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://cpi.transparency.org/
cpi20l /results/ [hereinafter CorruptionPerceptionsIndex]. The eight African countries
are Somalia, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Libya, Congo, Chad, and Angola. Id.
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Avoid Violations in an IncreasedEnforcement Environment

One of the primary reasons why a company should institute and
implement an effective compliance program is to prevent bribery and
avoid violating the relevant foreign bribery laws. Prevention is the best
defense to liability for foreign bribery.5 8 Assistant Attorney General
Lanny Breuer, the DOJ's head of the Criminal Division, has stated that
the DOJ's "preference" is for FCPA violations "to be prevented in the
first instance., 59 In this respect, he stressed, "[T]he only way that can
happen [in a company] is through a robust, state-of-the-art compliance
program and a true culture of compliance., 60 Furthermore, today, more
than ever, companies need to be vigilant in avoiding violations because
enforcement of foreign bribery laws has increased in the United States
and overseas.
1.

Increased Enforcement of the FCPA by the DOJ and SEC

In the United States, the DOJ and SEC, the two enforcers of the
FCPA, have vowed to become more aggressive in enforcing the FCPA.6 1
DOJ Attorney General Eric Holder has called corruption a "scourge on
civil society" and has stated that the DOJ would be vigorously
prosecuting violations of the FCPA.62 During a November 2010 speech,
DOJ Assistant Attorney General Breuer declared that the United States
was in "a new era of FCPA enforcement." 63 In 2011, Breuer
subsequently stressed that "[t]he fight against corruption" was a "law
58. This is especially true in an increased enforcement environment. See Claudius
0. Sokenu, FCPA Compliance Issues in the Global Marketplace: New Challenges for
Multinational Clients, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT COMPLIANCE ISSUES:
LEADING LAWYERS ON RESPONDING TO RECENT FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS,
MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, AND NAVIGATING RISK IN EMERGING

MARKETS 7, 1-2 (Michaela Falls ed. 2010); see also Lisa Stewart Hughes, Compliance
Program Management in the Age of Globalization, in ADVANCED COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS INSTITUTE 2010, 187 (PLI, Course Handbook, 2010); Amy Deen Westbrook,
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 495 (2011).
59. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Prepared Remarks to Compliance Week 2010-5th Annual Conference for Corporate
Financial, Legal, Risk, Audit & Compliance Officers 3 (May 26, 2010) [hereinafter
Breuer Speech], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/
2010/05-2610aag-compliance-week-speech.pdf.
60. Id.
61. See id.; Sokenu, supra note 58, at 1-3.
62. Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the Opening Plenary of the VI
Ministerial Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (Nov. 7,
2009), availableat http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/ 31641.htm.
63. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Remarks at the 24th National Conference
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/20 10/crm-speech- 101116.html.
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enforcement priority of the United States." 64 Similarly, the SEC formed
an FCPA specialty unit in 2010 to focus exclusively on FCPA
violations.6 5 According to SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami,
the unit would focus on "new" approaches to identifying FCPA
violations and would be "more proactive" when conducting foreign
bribery investigations.6 6
The DOJ and SEC have backed their words with action. The last
four years have involved the largest FCPA cases since the FCPA's
creation, including cases brought against Siemens AG,67 involving
68
involving
combined penalties of $800 million, and KBR/Halliburton,

64. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Remarks at the 26th National Conference
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html. Breuer also
stated that the fight against corruption was a "personal priority." Id
65. See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks at News Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New
Senior leaders (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/
spch0 1131Orsk.htm.
66. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, My
First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement, Remarks before the New York City Bar
(Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/2009/spchO8O5O9rk.htm.
67. See Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No.
08-CR-367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008); Sentencing Memorandum, United States v.
Siemens A.S. (Argentina), No. 08-CR-368-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008); Sentencing
Memorandum, United States v. Siemens Bangladesh Ltd., No. 08-CR-369-RJL (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 2008); Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens S.A. (Venezuela),
No. 08-CR-370-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html; SEC v.
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CV-02167 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008); SEC Files
Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery, Litigation Release No. 20829, 94 SEC Docket 2869 (Dec. 15, 2008),
Siemens was
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm.
charged with FCPA violations for engaging in a widespread and systematic practice of
paying bribes throughout the world. Id Siemens agreed to pay $350 million in
disgorgement to the SEC and a $450 million criminal fine to the DOJ. Id. Siemens also
agreed to pay a fine of approximately $569 million to the Office of the Prosecutor
General in Germany and had previously paid a $285 million fine to this same prosecutor
in October 2007, making the total amount of disgorgement and fines paid by Siemens
related to the matter in excess of $1.6 billion. Id.
68. See United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, L.L.C., No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex.
2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-l12.html; SEC v.
Halliburton Company & KBR, Inc., No. 09-CV-399 (S.D. Tex. 2009); SEC Charges
KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc. with Related
Accounting Violations, Litigation Release No. 20897A, 95 SEC Docket 570 (Feb. 11,
The
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/Ir20897.htm.
matter involved bribery of Nigerian government officials over a ten-year period to obtain
construction contracts. Id. Combined penalties totaled $579 million, with Kellogg
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combined penalties totaling $579 million. 69 In fact, 2010 marked the
biggest FCPA enforcement year in history, with 48 and 26 FCPA
enforcement actions brought by the DOJ and SEC, respectively. 70 Six of
the largest FCPA settlements of all time-accounting for over $1.5
billion in sanctions and penalties paid-also occurred in 2010.71
2.

Enforcement of the Foreign Bribery Laws on the International
Front

Enforcement of the foreign bribery laws has also become aggressive
on the international front. The SFO, the enforcer of the UK Bribery Act,
has promised aggressive enforcement of the new law. 72 SFO Director
Richard Alderman has also warned companies that the SFO would be
targeting bribery anywhere that the SFO finds it throughout the world.73

Brown & Root agreeing to pay a $402 million criminal fine to the DOJ, and its current
and former parent companies-KBR, Inc. and Halliburton Company-agreeing to pay
$177 million in disgorgement of profits to the SEC. Id.
69. See Thomas Fox, With Magyar in New Top Ten, It's 90% Non-U.S., FCPA
BLOG, (Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/withmagyar-in-new-top-ten-its-90-non-us.html.
70. See 2011 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN, at 2 (Jul. 11, 2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011 Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.pdf.
These numbers nearly doubled from the year before and are over five times what they
were five years before. Id. In 2009, there were 26 and 14 FCPA enforcement actions
brought by the DOJ and SEC, respectively; in 2005, there were only 7 FCPA
enforcement actions by the DOJ and 5 such actions by the SEC. Id Nevertheless, 2011
is likely to result in fewer enforcement actions because 2011 involved a large number of
trials involving defendants challenging FCPA actions, which resulted in the DOJ using a
substantial amount of resources. Id. at 1.
71. See Fox, supra note 69. The 2010 cases involved BAE Systems plc ($400
million), Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V./ENI S.p.A ($365 million), Technip S.A. ($338
million), Daimler AG ($185 million), Alcatel-Lucent ($137 million), and Panalpina, Inc.
($81.8 million).
Id.; Roger M. Witten et al., Anti-Corruption Enforcement
Developments: 2010 Year in Review and 2011 Preview, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 2011, 65, 66-72 (PLI, Course Handbook, 2011); United States v. BAE
Sys. plc, No. 10-CR-035-JDB (D.C. Feb. 4, 2010); United States v. Snamprogetti
Netherlands B.V., No. 10-CR-460 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2010); SEC v. ENI, S.p.A. and
Snamprogetti Netherlands, B.V., No. 10-cv-2414 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2010); United States
v. Daimler AG, No. 10-CR-063-RJL (D.C. Mar. 22, 2010); SEC v. Daimler AG, No. 10CV-00473 (D.C. Mar 22, 2010); United States v. Technip S.A., No. 10-CR-439 (S.D.
Tex. Jun. 28, 2010); SEC v. Technip S.A., No: I0-CV-02289 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 28, 2010);
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-CR-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010); SEC
v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No: 10-CV-24620 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010); United States v.
Panalpina, Inc., No: 10-CR-765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010); SEC v. Panalpina, Inc., No:
10-CV-4334 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010).
72. See Russell, supra note 5.
73. See Carolina Binham, SFO Chief Warns of New Global Reach, FINANCIAL TiMES
(May 23, 2011, 10:34 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8cO56ce2-8562-11 eO-ae3200144feabdc.html#axzzlyozAWsUt; see also C.M. Matthews, Alderman Warns
Foreign Companies on Bribery Law, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOGS (Dec. 7,
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Subsequently, in November 2011, the United Kingdom obtained its first
conviction under the UK Bribery Act.74
The OECD has also been advocating for aggressive enforcement of
foreign bribery laws. Although the United States, Germany, and Italy
have been proactive in prosecuting foreign bribery, OECD data reveals
that many other signatory countries to the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention have failed to bring any convictions or sanctions for foreign
bribery.75 In response to the discrepancy in enforcement, the OECD has
demanded stronger enforcement of the foreign bribery laws.76 OECD
Secretary-General Angel Gurria recently stated that the OECD needed to
see "clearer signs that all countries are committing the political
leadership and resources that effective enforcement requires" in
enforcing foreign bribery violations.77 As such, OECD countries are
under increasing pressure to enforce their respective foreign bribery
laws.

2011, 5:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/07/alderman-warnsforeign-companies-on-bribery-law/.
74. See Samuel Rubenfeld, Munir Patel, First Bribery Act Convict, Sentenced,
WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOGS (Nov. 18, 2011,

11:36 AM), http:/iblogs.

wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011 / 11/1 8/munir-patel-first-bribery-act-convict-sentenced/.
The conviction was based on domestic bribery violations under the UK Bribery Act, as
opposed to foreign bribery violations. Id. Nevertheless, the conviction is significant
because it signals the beginning of the UK Bribery Act's enforcement. See Eoin O'Shea,
Opinion: First Conviction Proves Bribery Act has Sharp Teeth, THE LAWYER, Nov. 28,
2011, available at http://www.thelawyer.com/opinion-first-conviction-proves-briberyact-has-sharp-teeth/101 0398.article.
75. See OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, 2010 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION (2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/39/47637707.pdf.

The OECD Working Group regularly monitors enforcement of the foreign bribery laws
by the parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and, as part of its monitoring,
compiles the data on enforcement of the relevant foreign bribery laws. Id. The OECD's
Working Group on Bribery published data concerning enforcement of the foreign bribery
laws by signatory countries for the first time in June 2010 and updated it in March 2011.
See Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
document/3/0,3746,en 2649 34859_45452483_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Aug. 11,
2012). The data revealed that, by the end of 2010, "199 individuals and 91 entities have
been sanctioned under criminal proceedings for foreign bribery" in 13 signatory countries
since the time that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention entered into force in 1999. Id. In
addition, the data found that "[a]pproximately 260 investigations" were ongoing in 15
signatory countries. Id. Nevertheless, the data also revealed that 24 of the 38 signatory
parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have not brought any sanctions for foreign
bribery. Id.
76. See Gurria Press Release, supra note 6.
77. Id. Transparency International has also become critical of the lack of progress in
enforcement of the foreign bribery laws by signatory countries to the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, available at http://issuu.com/transparency
international/docs/oecdreport 2011 ?mode-window&backgroundColor=%23222222.
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With respect to international enforcement of foreign bribery laws,
the United Kingdom and the OECD are now playing larger roles, but the
United States has been the strongest policeman. As noted in the OECD
data concerning enforcement of the foreign bribery laws, the United
States has brought the most cases of foreign bribery violations.7 8
Interestingly, many of these cases have focused on international
companies. 79 Most of the largest cases brought by the United States for
FCPA violations have been against international companies.80 As of
early 2012, nine out of the top ten largest FCPA cases ever brought by
the United States have been against foreign companies. 8' This trend has
caused some to surmise that the United States' focus "seems to be very
much on putting pressure on non-U.S. companies to comply with global
anti-corruption agreements, particularly when those companies' home
countries are less than aggressive in enforcement of their own corruption
82
laws.,
B.

MitigateLiability

Another reason why a corporation should implement an effective
compliance program is to mitigate and possibly avoid potential liability
for violations of foreign bribery laws. Although prevention is the best
answer to addressing foreign bribery concerns, sometimes violations
occur notwithstanding a company's best efforts to implement an
effective compliance program. In such situations, the existence of the
compliance program may serve to mitigate liability and penalties. In the
case of the UK Bribery Act, a compliance program may serve to act as a
total defense to liability.

78. See OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, supranote 75, at 4.
79. See Phillip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patternsin FCPA
Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan-2011 .pdf.
80. See Fox, supranote 69.
81. See id. The nine international companies and their respective nationalities are:
Siemens (Germany), BAE Systems (United Kingdom), Snamprogetti Netherlands
B.V./ENI S.p.A (Holland/Italy), Technip S.A. (France), JGC Corporation (Japan),
Daimler AG (Germany), Alcatel-Lucent (France), Magyar Telekom/Deutsche Telekom
(Hungary/Germany), and Panalpina (Switzerland). Id. The sole United States-based
company case on the top-ten list is KBR/Halliburton. Id.
82. Urofsky & Newcomb, supra note 79, at 1, 5-6. These authors note, "In the
thirty-three years since the FCPA was enacted in 1977 and the twelve years the AntiBribery Convention became effective in February 1998, there have been very few nonU.S. prosecutions for transnational bribery."
Id. at 6. The authors' further note,
"Although a recent OECD report highlights uneven gains in this area, it is clear that the
U.S. government intends to continue using its expansive view of jurisdiction under the
FCPA to spur foreign governments to be more proactive--or face the consequence of
seeing their domestic corporations hauled into U.S. courts." Id.
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United States Attorneys' Manual

With respect to criminal liability for FCPA violations, the DOJ
considers corporate compliance programs in determining whether to
reduce charges or to decline charging altogether. The DOJ's United
States Attorneys' Manual ("U.S. Attorneys' Manual") states that one of
the factors that prosecutors should consider in "determining whether to
bring charges" or negotiate a plea or settlement agreement for FCPA
violations is "the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's preexisting compliance program. '83 In this respect, the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual states, "[T]he critical factors in evaluating any program are
whether the program is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness
and whether
in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees
84
corporate management is enforcing the program.,
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual also takes into consideration the
implementation of a compliance program as a remedial effort by a
company after violations have been discovered.85 In this respect, the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual states that one of the factors that prosecutors
should consider in deciding whether to charge a corporation or resolve a
criminal case is "the corporation's remedial action, including any efforts
to implement an 86effective corporate compliance program or to improve
an existing one.",

83. DOJ, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.300(A)(5), (1997), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usam/.
84. Id. § 9-28.800(B). On the other hand, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states that, if
the compliance program is a "paper program," meaning that it exists merely on paper and
is not enforced, such a program should not be given any credit when violations take
place. Id. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual also states that "the existence of a compliance
program is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for
criminal misconduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents." Id. § 928.800(A). Finally, the Manual mentions that "the existence of a corporate compliance
program, even one that specifically prohibited the very conduct in question, does not
absolve the corporation from criminal liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior."
Id. § 9-28.800(B) (citing United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.
1983)). However, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual does state that "it may not be appropriate
to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance program
in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue
employee." Id. § 9-28.500(A).
85. See id. § 9-28.300(A)(6).
86. Id.; see also id § 9-28.900. The comment to this section states that "[i]n
determining whether or not to prosecute a corporation, the government may consider
whether the corporation has taken meaningful remedial measures." Id. § 9-28.900(B). In
this respect the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states, "[A] corporation's response to misconduct
says much about its willingness to ensure that such misconduct does not recur." Id. § 928.900(B).
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines

Corporate compliance procedures are also taken into account under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 8 7 Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, a court should consider six factors when determining the
appropriate sentence for a convicted defendant organization. 88 Four of
the six factors are considered for increasing a sentence, and two of them
are considered for mitigation.89
Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, "[t]he existence of an effective compliance and ethics
program" is one of the two factors that a sentencing court should
consider in deciding whether to mitigate a sentence. 90
Thus, a
corporation can use a pre-existing compliance program to9 seek, and in
some cases obtain, a reduced sentence for FCPA violations. 1
3.

The Seaboard Report

With respect to civil liability for issuers who have violated the
FCPA, the SEC's Seaboard Report provides such issuers with credit for
having in place effective compliance procedures. 92 Specifically, the
87. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8
(2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/ToCPDF.cfm
[hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were recently amended in 2010. Id.; see also Federal Sentencing Commission Modifies
Sentencing Guidelines Pertaining to Organizations, FCPA ALERT, (Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft LLP, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 15, 2010, available at http://
www.cadwalader.com/assets/newsletter/FCPAAlert April_2010.pdf; US Sentencing
Commission Approves Proposed Amendments to Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations and Expands and Clarifies the Role of Corporate Compliance and Ethics
Programs in Organizational Sentencing, CLIENT ALERT, (Latham & Watkins LLP, New
York, N.Y.), May 14, 2010, available at http://www.lw.com/search?searchText =
us+sentencing+commission+approves+proposed+amendments.
88. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, ch. 8, pt. A, introductory
cmt. (2010).
89. See id "The four factors [considered for] increas[ing] the ultimate punishment
of an organization are (i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the
prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an order; and (iv) the obstruction of
justice." Id. The two factors that are looked at for the purposes of mitigating a sentence
include "(i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii) selfreporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility." Id.
90. Id.
91. See id
92. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Actions, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23,
2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm; see also Press Release 2001-117, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and Statement Setting Forth Framework for
Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 23, 2011)
[hereinafter Evaluating Cooperation],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
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Seaboard Report lists certain criteria that the SEC will consider in
deciding whether, and how much, to credit certain behavior by issuers.9 3
One of the criteria is whether the issuer had instituted compliance
procedures designed to prevent the relevant misconduct that occurred.9 4
The criteria also considers why the relevant compliance procedures
95
failed to "stop or inhibit" the relevant wrongful conduct that occurred.
The Seaboard Report further considers remedial actions taken by the
issuer after the wrongful conduct has been discovered, including whether
the issuer adopted and enforced "more effective internal controls" and
compliance procedures "designed to prevent" the relevant wrongful
conduct from occurring again. 96 The credit that an issuer can receive
ranges from the "extraordinary step of taking no enforcement action" to
"bringing reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or including
mitigating language in documents" the SEC uses to "announce and
97
resolve enforcement actions.,
4.

Tenaris: The SEC's First Deferred Prosecution Agreement

Another important development with respect to civil liability
mitigation for issuers is that, on May 17, 2011, the SEC entered into its
first deferred prosecution agreement in Tenaris,98 a matter concerning
alleged violations of the FCPA. Tenaris involved an international steel
pipe manufacturing company that allegedly bribed Uzbekistan
government officials to receive contract awards from the Uzbekistan

headlines/prosdiscretion.htm. The Seaboard Report is a rare Report of Investigation
under Section 2 1(a) of the Exchange Act, which deals with an issuer that quickly reported
wrongdoing and cooperated with the SEC. Id In the report, the SEC took the
opportunity to announce certain criteria that it would consider in future enforcement
actions to reward and take into account self-disclosure of wrongful conduct, cooperation,
and the establishment of effective controls and procedures. Id.
93. See Seaboard Report, supra note 92, at 2-4.
94.

See id

95. Id.at 2.
96. Id. at 4; see Evaluating Cooperation, supra note 92.
97. Seaboard Report, supra note 92, at 2.
98. See Press Release 2011-112, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4
Million in SEC's First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011)
[hereinafter Tenaris], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 2011/2011-112.htm;
see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Tenaris, S.A., (May 17,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf.
Tenaris
agreed to pay approximately $5.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the
SEC. Id. In addition, the company agreed to pay a $3.5 million criminal penalty in a
related non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Tenaris S.A. Agrees to Pay $3.5 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve
Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 17, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/May/I 1-crm-629.html.
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government. 99 Apart from being the first time that the SEC has entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement, Tenaris is significant because the
case involves a company that was given credit by the SEC for remedial
efforts following the discovery of FCPA violations, including enhancing
its anti-bribery procedures.' 00
With respect to the role of compliance procedures as a basis in
Tenaris for the SEC to enter into the deferred prosecution agreement, the
SEC noted that, after the company conducted an internal review of its
operations and discovered the relevant FCPA violations, it informed the
SEC of its findings. The company also "reviewed its controls and
compliance measures and significantly enhanced its anti-corruption
policies

and practices."'' 0

1

SEC

Enforcement

Director

Khuzami

emphasized that these actions and the company's "enhanced anticorruption procedures... made it an appropriate candidate" for the
SEC's first deferred prosecution agreement.10 2
Khuzami noted,
"Effective enforcement of the securities laws includes acknowledging
and providing credit to those who fully and completely support [the
SEC's] investigations and who display an10 3exemplary commitment to
compliance, cooperation, and remediation."
5.

Adequate Procedures Defense under the UK Bribery Act

The existence of effective compliance procedures can serve as a
defense to liability under the UK Bribery Act. 10 4 Specifically, the UK
Bribery Act provides companies with a defense to liability under the
law's failure to prevent bribery section when the companies can establish
that they had in place "adequate" compliance procedures designed to
99. See Tenaris, supra note 98.
100. See id. The deferred prosecution agreement was part of an initiative announced
in early 2010 designed to encourage individuals and companies to cooperate and assist in
SEC investigations. Id.; see also Press Release 2010-6, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in
Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/20106.htm.
101. Tenaris, supra note 98.
102. Id.
103. Id. Under the deferred prosecution agreement, the SEC agreed to refrain from
prosecuting the company in a civil action if the company complied with certain
undertakings. One of the undertakings required that the company enhance its procedures
and controls to strengthen its compliance with the FCPA and anti-bribery practices.
Another undertaking required the company to implement due diligence requirements with
respect to the retention and payment of agents. In addition, the company was required to
provide detailed training on the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws and require
certification of compliance with the relevant anti-bribery policies. The company was also
required to notify the SEC of any complaints, charges, or convictions against it or its
employees related to anti-bribery or securities law violations. Id.
104. See UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, § 7(2).
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prevent foreign bribery.10 5 The important defense can be available to
companies even when foreign bribery has occurred within the company's
operations. 106
IV. GUIDANCE ON AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN BRIBERY
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
Given the importance of instituting an effective foreign bribery
compliance program, the pertinent issue that must be addressed is what
procedures should be included in an international foreign bribery
compliance program. The procedures should not only prevent bribery
and protect companies from liability under the FCPA, but should also
protect companies from the prevailing foreign bribery risks and laws
associated in operating in multiple jurisdictions around the world.
Although there is no formal or magic set of perfect compliance
procedures that will guarantee immunity for multinational organizations,
there is domestic and international guidance from certain authorities that
companies can utilize in determining what procedures should be included
in an international foreign bribery compliance program.
A.

Domestic Guidance on ComplianceProcedures under the FCPA

Several sources of domestic guidance can be used to outline
procedures for instituting an effective compliance program under the
FCPA. The two most important sources are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and recent DOJ non-prosecution and deferred prosecution
agreements.
1.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines

As noted above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow a
company convicted of FCPA violations to seek a reduction in its
105. UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, § 7(2).
106. Id. The United Kingdom did not want to impose liability on companies that
acted in good faith through their compliance programs. The UK Ministry of Justice has
stated that the "objective" of the UK Bribery Act "is not to bring the full force of the
criminal law to bear upon well run commercial organisations that experience an isolated
incident of bribery on their behalf," and, therefore, "in order to achieve an appropriate
balance," the UK Bribery Act included the adequate procedures defense. See MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE ABOUT PROCEDURES WHICH RELEVANT
COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS CAN PUT INTO PLACE TO PREVENT PERSONS ASSOCIATED
WITH THEM FROM BRIBING (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY ACT 2010), at 8 (Mar. 30, 2011)
[hereinafter UK GUIDANCE], available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/

bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. It further noted that the adequate procedures defense is
"in recognition of the fact that no bribery prevention regime will be capable of preventing
bribery at all times" and that the defense was also designed "to encourage" companies "to
put procedures in place to prevent bribery by persons associated with them." Id.
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sentence when it can show that it had in place an "effective" compliance
program. 1 7 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines spell out the procedures
that should be included in an "effective" compliance program. 108
According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, an organization
must meet the following two critical conditions to have an "effective"
compliance program: (1) it must "exercise due diligence to prevent and
detect criminal conduct;" and (2) it must "promote an organizational
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law."' 0 9 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines then provide a
detailed list of minimum procedures that should be included in a
compliance program to meet these two critical conditions." 0 Among
these procedures is a requirement that a company's "governing
authority" be knowledgeable about the compliance program and exercise
"reasonable oversight" over the "implementation and effectiveness" of
the program."' Another requirement is that the company periodically
within the organization,
communicates the compliance procedures
2
otherwise.'l
or
training
by
whether
2.

DOJ Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements

Another source of guidance can be found in recent non-prosecution
and deferred prosecution agreements between the DOJ and companies
that have settled with it for FCPA violations.1 3 Under these agreements,
companies reaching settlements with the DOJ are generally required to
ensure that they have FCPA compliance programs in place that include
certain minimum procedures in them as spelled out by the DOJ."H4 These
107.
cmt.
108.
109.
110.

FEDERAL SENTENCING

GUIDELINES,

supra note 87, at ch. 8, pt. A, introductory

See id § 8B2.
Id.§ 8B2(a).
See id. § 8B2(b).

111. Id. § 8B2(b)(2)(A).
112. See id. § 8B2(b)(4)(A).
113. Non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements are legal settlement
instruments typically used by the DOJ whereby a company and the DOJ will enter into a
contract that contains certain requirements that the company must satisfy and, in
exchange, the DOJ will not prosecute or defer prosecution. Rebecca Walker, The
Evolution of the Law of CorporateCompliance in the United States: A BriefOverview, in
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND

ETHICS INSTITUTE HANDBOOK,

136-37 (PLI, Course

Handbook, 2011). Specifically, under a non-prosecution agreement, no charge will
initially be filed in court, but the DOJ can later file and prosecute a charge against the
company if the company violates the terms of the agreement. Id. Under a deferred

prosecution agreement, the government will file a criminal charge in court but will not
prosecute the claim. Id. If the company abides by the terms of the agreement, the DOJ
will then dismiss the charge when the agreement expires. Id Likewise, if the company
violates the terms of the agreement, the DOJ can prosecute the already-filed charge. Id.
114.

Seeid atl37.
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agreements are excellent sources of guidance because15 they are
continuously updated as the DOJ reaches newer settlements.
A recent non-prosecution agreement that describes what the DOJ
looks for in an effective compliance program can be found in Armor
Holdings. 16 In Armor Holdings, the company agreed to adopt or modify
its compliance procedures to maintain "a system of internal accounting
controls designed to ensure" that the company makes and keeps "fair and
accurate books, records, and accounts."'" 17 The company also agreed to
adopt or modify its procedures so that it maintained "a rigorous anticorruption compliance code, standards, and procedures designed to
detect and deter violations of the FCPA and other applicable anticorruption laws." '1 8 The agreement then listed "minimum" procedures
that should be included in the compliance program. 19 Among these
procedures is the calling for policies governing the provisions of gifts,
hospitality, and entertainment expenses.120 Another procedure calls for
the internal and confidential reporting of suspected or actual violations of
the compliance program and foreign bribery
laws by employees and third
21
company.
the
of
behalf
on
parties acting
Many of the minimum procedures outlined in the Armor Holdings
non-prosecution agreement can also be found in recent deferred
prosecution agreements. In the recent deferred prosecution agreement in
Alcatel-Lucent,'22 one of the largest FCPA cases ever brought against a
115. Compliance procedures contained in many of the non-prosecution agreements
and deferred prosecution agreements are very similar to, and sometimes mirror, the
recommended procedures in the OECD Good Practice Guidance. See infra notes 126-36
and accompanying discussion.
116. See Armor Holdings, Inc. Non-Prosecution Agreement (Jul. 13, 2011), app. B, at
1-2 [hereinafter Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement], available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/armor/07-31-11 armor-holdings.pdf; see
also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Armor Holdings Agrees to Pay $10.2 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Jul. 13,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/July/ Il-crm-9 11 .html.
The
matter involved the payment of more than $200,000 in commissions to a third-party sales
agent, a portion of which was passed to a United Nations procurement official to induce
the official to award two separate contracts. Id.
117. Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 11.
118. Id.
119. Id. There were 13 recommended minimum procedures in all. Id.
120. Seeid. at 1-12.
121. See id. at 13.
122. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement attach. C at 69-74, United States v. AlcatelLucent, S.A., No. 10-20907-CR-Moore/Simonton (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crimina/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/02-22- 11 alcatel-dpa.pdf; see
also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec.
27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 10/December/ 10-crm- 1481 .html.
Alcatel agreed to pay a total amount of $137 million to settle the matter with the DOJ and
SEC ($92 million to the DOJ and $45 million to the SEC). Id.; see also Press Release
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single issuer, the company agreed to adopt and modify its compliance
program to include many of the same procedures contained in Armor
Holdings. Similarly, in a recent FCPA enforcement sweep involving
charges against multiple oil services companies that engaged in bribery
through the freight forwarding company Panalpina, all of the oil services
companies and Panalpina were required to adopt compliance programs
through deferred prosecution or other agreements that included most of
the procedures contained in Armor Holdings and Alcatel-Lucent. 123 For
example, in the deferred prosecution agreement in the Panalpina-related
case of Tidewater,'24 the company was required to "institute appropriate
due diligence and compliance requirements pertaining to the retention

2010-258, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Alcatel-Lucent with FCPA
Violations (Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/20 10258.htm. Alcatel-Lucent was charged with violating the FCPA for paying bribes to
foreign officials in Latin America and Asia. Id.
123. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More
than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 0/November/I 0-crm-1251 .html. The DOJ obtained
more than $156 million in criminal penalties, and the SEC obtained approximately $80
million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties, rendering the total amount paid by the
relevant companies involved in the Panalpina-related sweep at $236 million. Id.; see also
Press Release 2010-214, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services
and Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov.
For the
4, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm.
relevant Panalpina-related deferred prosecution and other agreements with the DOJ, see
the following sources: Deferred Prosecution Agreement attach. C at 49-52, United States
v. Pride International, Inc., No. 10-766 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), available at
Deferred
Prosecution
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/pride-intl-dpa.pdf,
Agreement attach. C at 51-58, United States v. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Prod. Co.
Ltd., No. 10-767 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
Deferred
Prosecution
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/snepco/1 1-04-10snepco-dpa.pdf,
Agreement attach. C at 48-54, United States v. Transocean Inc., No. 10-768 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/transoceanin/l 1-04-10transocean-dpa.pdf; Plea Agreement attach. C at 63-70, United States v.
Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.
Deferred
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-inc/1 1-04-10panalpina-plea.pdf,
Prosecution Agreement attach. C at 67-73, United States v. Panalpina World Transp.
(Holding) Ltd., No. 10-769 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/panalpina-world/l 1-04-1 Opanalpinaworld-dpa.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement attach. C at 57-63, United States v.
Tidewater Marine Int'l, Inc., No. 10-770 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Tidewater
Deferred Prosecution Agreement], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/tidewater-intl/ll-04-10tidewater-dpa.pdf; Plea Agreement attach. C at
49-52, United States v. Pride Forasol S.A.S., No. 10-771 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010),
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pride-forasol/12-07-10
pride-forasol-plea-agree.pdf; Noble Corporation Non-Prosecution Agreement attach. B at
20-25 (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/noble-corp/ 11-04-1 Onoble-corp-npa.pdf.
124. Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at 62-63.
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and oversight of all agents and business partners," 125
a requirement also
mandated under Armor Holdings and Alcatel-Lucent.
B.

InternationalGuidance

Outside of domestic guidance on compliance procedures under the
FCPA, there is international guidance on procedures that should be

considered in a compliance program. The most noteworthy source is
recent guidance provided by the OECD.
1.

OECD Good Practice Guidance

The best source of guidance on procedures that should be included

in an international foreign bribery compliance program can be found in
the OECD Good Practice Guidance.1 26

The OECD Good Practice

Guidance, released in February 2010, has been hailed by OECD
Secretary-General Angel Gurria as "the most comprehensive guidance
ever provided to companies and business organisations by an
127
international organisation" on the issue of foreign bribery procedures.
The OECD Good Practice Guidance is also the first and only set of anti-

bribery compliance procedures to have received the endorsement of
multiple international governments. 128 As such, the recommended
125. Id.; Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 13;
Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at 73. There are two
other good sources of guidance by the DOJ on what it views to be certain minimum
procedures that should be included in an effective compliance program. These sources
outdate the amended Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the relevant non-prosecution and
deferred prosecution agreements discussed in this article, but are worth mentioning. One
of these sources is the consent agreement in the 1999 civil case of United States v.
Metcalf and Eddy, Inc. See Complaint, United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No.
1:99CV12566 (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 1999); Consent and Undertaking of Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., at 2-5, available at http://corporatecompliance.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Resources/ComplianceBasics/MetcalfEddy.pdf. In Metcalf & Eddy, the DOJ provided
what it considered to be minimum components of an effective FCPA compliance
program for the first time. Id.The other source of guidance is the DOJ Opinion Release
No. 04-02. See DOJ Opinion Procedure Release, No. 04-02 (Jul. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2004/0402.pdf.
In the opinion
release, the DOJ found a requestors' compliance program to have contained "significant
precautions against future violations of the FCPA" and appeared to have supported the
relevant procedures under the compliance program as outlined in the release. Id. at 2-3.
126. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7. The OECD Good Practice
Guidance was adopted as an "integral part" of the OECD Recommendation and became
Annex Itto the OECD Recommendation. Id.;
see also OECD RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 44, at 1.
127. See OECD Calls on Businesses to Step Up their Fight Against Bribery, OECD
(Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3746,en_21571361_
44315115 44697385 1 1 1_1,00.html.
128. See id.; Recent Top DOJ Official Shares Insights into FCPA Policies,
Enforcement Strategies,Public-PrivateCooperationand Role of the OECD, THE METRO.
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procedures in the OECD Good Practice Guidance are important because
they go beyond the procedures recommended for any specific foreign
bribery law and are intended to be used on a global scale to comply with
foreign bribery laws throughout the world.
The OECD Good Practice Guidance contains 12 best practices and
procedures that should be implemented in a compliance program.129 One
of the practices states that a compliance program should contain "a
clearly articulated and visible corporate policy prohibiting foreign
bribery.' 130
Another practice calls for financial and accounting
procedures designed to ensure the maintenance of accurate books and
records so that they cannot be used to conceal foreign bribery.' 3'
The OECD Good Practice Guidance has generally been endorsed by
the signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 3 2 The OECD
Good Practice Guidance has also received the support of the United
States. Mark Mendelsohn, the former Deputy Chief of the DOJ's Fraud
Section at the time that the OECD Good Practice Guidance came out,
indicated during a February 2010 speech that the DOJ approved of the
OECD Good Practice Guidance. 3 3 In addition, Assistant Attorney
General Breuer echoed support for the OECD Good Practice Guidance.
During a May 2010 speech, Assistant Attorney General Breuer stated
that he considered the guidance to be a "benchmark" for what should be
included in an effective compliance program and urged domestic
companies to consider tailoring their existing compliance programs to
incorporate the guidance. 34 Given this support, some have opined that
CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2, 2010, at 12-13, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.
com/articles/12831/recent-top-doj-official-shares-insights-fcpa-policies-enforcementstrategies-public-p (interviewing Mark F. Mendelsohn of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP).
129. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 1.
130. Id.
131. See id.
at 2.
132. Id; see also Joseph Murphy & Donna Boehme, Commentary: OECD Good
Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance, 1840 PLI/CoRP 243,
249 (2010). The OECD Good Practice Guidance is part of the OECD Recommendation.
See OECD RECOMMENDATION, supra note 44.
133. See Melissa K. Aguilar, OECD Anti-Bribery Guide as Path to FCPA
Compliance, COMPLIANCE WK., Mar. 30, 2010, at 2.
134. Breuer Speech, supra note 59, at 5. Breuer stated:
If you haven't read the OECD Guidance yet, read it ...[a]nd then think about
how you might tailor the Guidance to your organization ...[a]nd know that, as
you do, the [DOJ's] Criminal Division cares about all the things you might be
considering-'tone from the top' support, encouragement of a culture of
compliance that rewards ethical behavior and establishes whistle-blowing
mechanisms, senior-level oversight and direct-reporting lines, periodic reviews
and re-evaluations to test and ensure program effectiveness, appropriate
disciplinary mechanisms, and extension of anti-corruption policies to thirdparty agents and business partners, to name a few.
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the DOJ may end up using the OECD Good Practice Guidance as a
framework in evaluating pre-existing compliance programs. 135 In this
author's opinion, the DOJ may already be doing so given that many of
the compliance procedures mandated in recent DOJ non-prosecution and
all, of the
deferred prosecution agreements appear to mirror most, if not
136
procedures contained in the OECD Good Practice Guidance.
2.

UK Guidance

The United Kingdom's Ministry of Justice, on March 30, 2011,
provided another international source of guidance concerning procedures
that companies should institute to prevent violations of the UK Bribery
Act. 137 The guidance, entitled "Guidance about Procedures which
Relevant Commercial Organisations can put into Place to Prevent
PersonsAssociatedwith Them from Bribing" ("UK Guidance"), provides
guidelines for what the Ministry of Justice considers "adequate
defense
procedures" for purposes of meeting the "adequate procedures"
138
to the UK Bribery Act's failure to prevent bribery section.
Under the UK Guidance, a company's compliance program should
be governed by six primary guiding principles. 139 The first guiding
principle provides that a company's program and procedures should be
"proportionate" to the bribery risks that it faces and that the procedures
should be "clear, practical, accessible, effectively implemented and
enforced."' 140 A second principle stresses that the procedures should
provide for a "top-level management" commitment to the prevention of
foreign bribery.' 4' The third principle states that companies should
assess the "nature and extent of its exposure" to potential external and
internal bribery risks so that the companies may address them
Id.
135.

See Aguilar, supra note 133, at 1; Steven A. Tyrell, The OECD Releases Good

Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance to Curb Foreign
Bribery, in EIGHTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS' INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (PLI,

Course Handbook, 2010).
136. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying discussion.
137.

See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106.

138. Id.; see also UK Bribery Act, supra note 3, § 7(2).
139. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 6, 20.
140. Id. at 21. To meet this principle, the UK Guidance recommends that an "initial
assessment of risk" across an organization be undertaken and that the procedures be
formulated to take into account the assessed risk. Id. The language contained within the
first principle of the UK Guidance also provides an "indicative" but "not exhaustive" list
of topics that an organization's procedures "might embrace depending on the particular
risks" that it faces. Id.
141. Id. at 23. In this respect, the second principle recommends that senior
management "foster a culture" within the corporation that bribery is "never acceptable."
Id.
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accordingly.1 42 A fourth principle calls for due diligence over persons
"who perform or will perform services" on behalf of the corporation in
order to avoid or reduce the risk of bribery.143 The fifth principle stresses
that the relevant anti-bribery procedures should be communicated
throughout the corporation, whether by training or otherwise. 144 Finally,
a sixth principle calls for monitoring and review of the relevant antibribery procedures
to ensure that they are effective in preventing
145
bribery.
3.

Transparency International Business Principles for Countering
Bribery

Another source of international guidance on compliance procedures
can be found through Transparency International.
Transparency
International is a leading international non-governmental organization in
the fight against corruption and foreign bribery.' 46 Transparency
International has published guidelines-Business Principles for
Countering Bribery ("Transparency Business Principles")-which are
designed to help companies develop and implement anti-bribery
compliance programs. 147

The Transparency Business Principles state that companies "shall
prohibit bribery in any form whether direct or indirect" and "shall
commit to implementing" an anti-bribery compliance program "to
counter bribery.' 48 The Transparency Business Principles provides
guidance on the development, scope, and implementation of an antibribery compliance program. 149 Among other things, it states that
political or charitable contributions should not be used as an avenue to

142. Id. at 25.
143. Id.at 27.
144. See id. at 29.
145. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 31. The UK Guidance states that its
recommendations are not intended to be "prescriptive" and that the guidance is not
intended to be a "one-size-fits-all" document. Id.at 6.
146. See About Us, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/about-us (last
visited Aug. 16, 2012). Transparency International's goal is to ensure a "world free of
corruption." Id. Transparency International is known for its "Corruptions Perception
Index," which rates countries based on how corrupt people perceive them to be. See
Corruption Perceptions Index, supra note 57. The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index
listed New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Singapore as the five least corrupt
countries in the world. Id.By contrast, the index listed Somalia, North Korea, Myanmar,
Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan as the five most corrupt countries in the world. Id. The
United States ranked 24th out of 182 countries. Id.
147. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY (2d ed.
2009) [hereinafter TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES].
148. Id.at 6.
149. See id. at 7-14.
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obtain a business advantage.' 50 The principles also stress that senior
management should be responsible for implementing and carrying out
the anti-bribery compliance program.151
V.

MINIMUM COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES, COVERING A TO Z, THAT
NEED TO BE INCLUDED IN A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL

FOREIGN BRIBERY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
There are essential procedures that should be included in a
comprehensive international foreign bribery compliance program. The
compliance program should contain procedures recommended under
both domestic and international guidance designed to prevent and detect
15 2
foreign bribery.
The comprehensive international foreign bribery compliance
program should use best practices in: (1) developing a compliance
program, such as designing procedures based on a risk assessment of the
foreign bribery risks that a company faces; (2) writing policies and
procedures in the compliance program itself, such as procedures
governing the due diligence of third party agents acting on behalf of the
company; and (3) monitoring and reviewing the compliance program,
such as periodic reviews of the program to evaluate its effectiveness.
Thus, the compliance program should involve best practices from the
inception of the program to the monitoring of the program after it has
been formalized.
Furthermore, for the compliance program to be
effective, it needs to address foreign bribery concerns consistent with the
relevant anti-bribery laws in all jurisdictions that the company
operates. 153
Although an analysis of every anti-bribery law is beyond the scope
of this article, an analysis of the guidance on compliance procedures
provided through the OECD Good Practice Guidance, UK Guidance,
Transparency Business Principles, and domestic guidance on the FCPA,
can provide a minimum set of procedures that should be included in any

150. See id. at 8.
151. See id. at 9. Transparency International has also published a "Guidance
Document" to the Business Principles. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES
FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY: GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (2004). The Guidance Document is a

comprehensive guide to the Transparency International Business Principles that is
intended to help companies implement and review their anti-bribery compliance
programs. See id. at 4.
152. For a list of what this author believes to be essential procedures that should be
involved in an FCPA compliance program, or what this author calls the "Eleven
Commandments" of an effective FCPA compliance program, see Jon Jordan, The
Adequate ProceduresDefense Under the UK Bribery Act: A British Idea for the Foreign
CorruptPracticesAct, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. &FIN. 25, 60-65 (2011).
153. See TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 7.
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international foreign bribery compliance program.
Notably, any
compliance program also needs to account for the subjective risks and
laws affecting that particular company. This article provides only a
minimum list of procedures that should be included in a given
company's international foreign bribery compliance program.
A.

Risk Assessment of Foreign Bribery Risks

One of the first steps a company should take in developing an
international foreign bribery compliance program is to conduct a risk
assessment to address the individual circumstances and specific foreign
bribery risks facing the company. 154 One of the most important
considerations is the geographical organization of the company and the
locations of its operations. 155 The more corrupt the country in which the
company conducts business, the higher the risk of foreign bribery
occurring.156 Another important foreign bribery risk concerns the
industrial sector involved in the company's operations. 157
Some
industrial sectors,
such
as
the
oil
and
gas
sector,
are
more
prone
to
1 58
foreign bribery.
Once the relevant foreign bribery risks have been identified, the
company should develop and tailor its compliance policies and
procedures, including a system of internal controls, to effectively address
the identified risks.159 As such, the compliance policies and procedures
154. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 1; UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 25; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 7; Armor
Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, at C-2,C-3.
155. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 1; UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 26; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 7; Armor

Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, at C-3.
156. See sources cited supra note 155; see also CorruptionPerceptionsIndex, supra
note 57 (listing the most corrupt countries in the world).
157. See sources cited supra note 155.
158. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 26. Other risk factors that a company
should consider in conducting a risk assessment include: (1) interactions between the
company and foreign government officials; (2) the company's involvement in business
partner or joint venture arrangements; (3) the "importance of licenses and permits in the
company's operations"; (4) the "degree of governmental oversight and inspection" over
the company's operations; (5) the volume and importance of goods clearing through
customs in a foreign country; and (6) the volume and importance of personnel clearing
through immigration in a foreign country. See id.; Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 123, at C-3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122,
at C-3.
159. See sources cited supra note 154.
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developed should be "proportionate to the bribery risks" that the
company faces and to the "nature, scale and complexities" of the
company's operations. 160 After the initial risk assessment, the foreign
bribery risks facing the company should be "regularly monitored, reassessed, and adapted as necessary to ensure the continued effectiveness"
of the compliance program.161
B.

Clearand Articulate Policy

The compliance program, and the policies and procedures within it,
should provide a "clearly articulated and visible corporate policy"
prohibiting foreign bribery. 162 The policy should be "memorialized in a
written compliance code" and should clearly, and in reasonable detail,
articulate all of the relevant procedures designed to prevent foreign
bribery from occurring through any activities under the company's
effective control. 163 The policy should include clearly articulated
procedures related to the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and
internal control provisions, as well as to the relevant foreign anti-bribery
laws governing the company.164
C.

Strong, Explicit, and Visible Support and Commitmentfrom Senior
Management

Senior management in a company should provide "strong, explicit,
and visible support and commitment" to the company's compliance
Senior management should include the highest-level
program. 165

UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 21.
OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 1; see also UK GUIDANCE,
supra note 106, at 25; FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1 (c).
162. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 1; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at C-i; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at C-i; see also UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 21; TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 7.
163. Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1;
Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-i; Alcatel-Lucent
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at C-l; see also TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 7.
164. See Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1;
Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-i; Alcatel-Lucent
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at C-1.
165. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 1; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at C-2; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at C-I; see also TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at
9; UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 23; FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note
87, § 8B2.l(b)(2).
160.

161.
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officials of the company and, ideally, involve the board of directors and
chief executive officer. 166 The commitment by senior management
should involve communications by senior management of the company's
167
44
and of the company's compliance program.
"anti-bribery stance"
Senior management should also be involved and have some
of relevant policies and procedures
responsibility over the development
6
9
program.
in the compliance
D.

Compliance Applies to all Levels of the Company, Including Third
PartiesActing on Behalf of the Company

Following the relevant compliance program procedures should be
the "duty of' and apply to individuals at "all levels of the company" and
to outside and/or third parties acting on behalf of the company.1 69 In this
respect, the compliance program should apply to all directors, officers,
and employees. 170 The compliance program should also apply to all
"outside parties acting on behalf' of the company in a foreign
consultants,
intermediaries,
"agents,
including
jurisdiction,
suppliers,
and
contractors
partners,
teaming
representatives, distributors,
consortia, and joint venture partners" used or employed by the
company.17 1 The compliance program should further apply to all such
individuals and entities 72over which the company has "effective control,"
including subsidiaries. 1

E.

Oversight of Compliance Programby Senior Executives

A company should assign one or more senior corporate executives
I3
1
or officers responsibility for oversight of the compliance program.
166. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 23; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 9; see also Murphy & Boehme, supra note 132, at 257.
167. UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 23.
168. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 23-24; FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
supra note 87, § 8B2. 1(b)(2).
169.

OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings Non-

Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at C-2; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supranote 122, at C-2.
170. Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1;
Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-2; Alcatel-Lucent
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at C-2.
171. See sources cited supra note 170.
172. TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 9.
173. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 9; FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 87, § 8B2. 1(b)(2); Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116,

app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-4; AlcatelLucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at C-3.
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The relevant senior executives should have direct reporting obligations to
independent monitoring bodies, such as the board of directors, or any
pertinent committee of the board of directors such as an internal audit
committee. 17 4 The senior executives should also have an "adequate level
of autonomy from management" and the necessary resources and
authority to maintain such autonomy. 175 A type of senior executive that
responsibilities is the company's chief
could fulfill the relevant oversight
176
ethics and compliance officer.
Prevent and Prohibitthe Making of Improper Gifts

F.

Gifts can be illegal or can be perceived to be illegal when they have
any kind of influence in obtaining or retaining business. In United States
v. Mercator Corp.,177 a bank acting as an advisor to the Kazakhstan

government violated the FCPA by gifting two snowmobiles to a senior
Kazakhstan government official who had the ability to influence whether
the bank obtained or retained business from the government. Mercator
gifts, even small ones, can easily land a
illustrates how improper
178
water.
hot
in
company
A compliance program should include procedures that scrutinize
gifts to ensure that they are not bribes designed to obtain or retain
business. 179 In this respect, the compliance program should prohibit the
offer or receipt of gifts "whenever they could affect or be perceived to
of business transactions and are not reasonable and
affect the outcome
180
bona fide.'

174.

See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings Non-

Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at C-4; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at C-3.
175. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 60; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at C-3.
176. See Murphy & Boehme, supra note 132, at 259-63.
177. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New York Merchant Bank Pleads
Guilty to FCPA Violation (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2010/August/10-crm-909.html; United States v. Mercator Corp., No. 3:03-CR-404
(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2010).
178. See United States v. Mercator Corp., No. 3:03-CR-404.
179. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 22; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8; Armor
Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at C-3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, at C-2.
180. TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8.
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Prevent and ProhibitImproperHospitality,Entertainment, and
Expenses
Like payment of gifts, the payment and receipt of hospitality,

entertainment, and expenses raise anti-bribery concerns when such
expenses potentially influence the outcome of a relevant business
A company's compliance program should, therefore,
transaction.
explicitly scrutinize and prohibit the offer or receipt of hospitality,
entertainment, and expenses between the company and foreign officials

to ensure that
such expenses are not used to improperly obtain or retain
18 1
business.
H.

Prevent and ProhibitImproper Customer Travel

Customer travel is another problematic area. The FCPA provides
an exception for reasonable and actual expenditures for travel and
lodging if such expenditures are directly related to the promotion and

demonstration of products and to the execution or performance of a
contract with a foreign government or agency. 182 However, what
happens when the customer travel involves travel, or "field trips," to
non-business related entertainment destinations such as Disney World or
Las Vegas?

In UTStarcom, 183 the DOJ and SEC alleged that a company had
violated the FCPA after the company had paid approximately seven
million dollars for 225 foreign trips by employees of a Chinese stateowned company that were supposedly for training purposes. According
to the allegations, the company paid employees to travel to popular
tourist destinations including Hawaii, Las Vegas, and New York City for
training at the company's facilities.1 84 However, the company had no
185
facilities at these locations nor did it conduct any training at them.
181. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 22; TRANSPARENCY BuSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8; Armor
Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 2.
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010); see also
supranote 19 and accompanying discussion.
183. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, UTStarcom Inc. Agrees to Pay $1.5
Million Penalty for Acts of Foreign Bribery in China (Dec. 31, 2009) [hereinafter
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
UTStarcom
Press
Release],
December/09-crm-1390.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges
Cal. Telecom Co. with Bribery and Other FCPA Violations (Dec. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/ lr21357.htm; SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No.
09-cv-6094 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009).
184. See sources cited supra note 183.
185. See sources cited supra note 183.
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Rather, the "true purpose for providing these trips was to obtain and
retain lucrative telecommunications contracts. 186
UTStarcom illustrates why customer travel should be scrutinized to
ensure that such travel is not for the improper purpose of obtaining or
retaining contracts from foreign government officials. 187 In this respect,
a company's compliance program should include procedures designed to
examine all planned and paid customer travel to make sure that such
travel is for proper purposes in accordance with the foreign bribery
laws. 188

.

Prevent and ProhibitImproper PoliticalContributions

Political contributions are another problematic area when they are
made to a foreign official, candidate for foreign political office, or
foreign political party for the purpose of influencing any act or decision
of that person in his or her official capacity or future official capacity.
An international foreign bribery compliance program should include
procedures designed to prohibit political contributions that influence the
act or decision by any relevant individual or political party in assisting
the company to obtain or retain business. 189 The procedures should
require an exercise of due diligence over all anticipated political
contributions to make sure that the contributions will not be directed to
individuals or political parties that are or will be in a position to award
the company business or help it retain business. A good procedure that
could serve to deter the making of wrongful political contributions would
be a requirement that the company publicly disclose all of its political
contributions. 190
Such transparency would deter a company, or
individuals acting on behalf of the company, from making any suspicious
contributions.

186. See UTStarcom Press Release, supra note 183.
187. See sources cited supra note 183.
188. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B at 1; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at C; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note, 122, add. at C-2.
189.

See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; UK GUIDANCE, supra

note 106, at 22; TRANSPARENCY BusINEss PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8; Armor
Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, add. at C-3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at C-2.
190. See TRANSPARENCY BuSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8.
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Prevent and ProhibitImproper CharitableContributions

Similar to political contributions, charitable contributions raise antibribery concerns when paid as a way to help the company obtain or
retain business. For example, in Schering-Plough,'9' the SEC charged a
company with violations of the FCPA's accounting provisions when it
found that the company's Polish subsidiary had made donations to a
charitable foundation led by a Polish government official to induce that
official to purchase the company's pharmaceutical products for his
region's health fund. The SEC alleged that the company's procedures
for detecting FCPA violations were inadequate because "they did not
require employees to conduct any due diligence prior to making
promotional or charitable donations to determine whether ' 92any
government officials were affiliated with [the] proposed recipients."'
A compliance program should include procedures designed to
ensure that charitable contributions are not made for the improper
purpose of obtaining or retaining business in contravention of the foreign
bribery laws. 193 The procedure should include an exercise of due
diligence over all anticipated charitable contributions to ensure that such
expenditures will not be directed towards organizations affiliated with
government officials who may help the company obtain or retain
business.' 94 A good procedure that could serve to deter the making of
wrongful charitable contributions would be a requirement that the
company publicly disclose all of its charitable contributions.' 95
K. Prevent and ProhibitImproper Sponsorships
Sponsorships also raise anti-bribery concerns when paid to help the
company obtain or retain business. A compliance program should
therefore include procedures designed to ensure that sponsorships are not
used to improperly obtain or retain business in violation of the foreign
bribery laws. 19 6 Such a policy would include procedures mandating that
due diligence be conducted over any anticipated sponsorships to ensure
that they are not affiliated with any foreign official or political party in a
position to help the company obtain or retain business.

191. See In re Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 2032, 2004 WL 1267922 (Jun. 9,
2004). The SEC found that the company had improperly recorded these payments in its
books and records. Id. at *3.
192. Id. at *3.
193. See sources cited supra note 181.
194. See In re Schering-Plough, supra note 191.
195. See TRANSPARENCY BusrNEss PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8.
196. See sources cited supra note 181.
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Prevent and ProhibitFacilitationPayments

Among the most controversial types of payments involving the
foreign bribery laws is facilitation or "grease" payments designed to
expedite or secure the performance of routine government actions, such
as the processing of permits or visas.1 97 As previously noted, the FCPA
provides an exception for facilitation payments for violations of the antibribery provisions. 198 The language within the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention also allows for "small" facilitation payments. 99 However,
the prevailing international view on such payments is that they are
illegal.
Since the enactment of the FCPA, almost none of the other enacted
foreign bribery laws have provided an exception for facilitation
payments. 200 The same is true of the relevant foreign bribery treaties,
with the exception of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 20 1 Even the
OECD has recently changed its attitude with respect to its tolerance for
facilitation payments. In 2009, the OECD called on signatory nations to
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to end the permissibility of what it
called "corrosive" facilitation payments.20 2 In 2010, the OECD Working
Group on Bribery issued a report on the United States criticizing its
foreign anti-bribery policies regarding facilitation payments.20 3 Indeed,
there are currently only five countries-including the United Stateswhich provide an exception for facilitation payments under their relevant

197. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
198. See id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying discussion.
199. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6, at cmt. 9. Commentary 9
provides: "Small 'facilitation' payments do not constitute payments made 'to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage' within the meaning" of the anti-bribery
provision of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention "and, accordingly, are also not an

offence." Id.
200. See TRACE INT'L INC., TRACE FACILITATION PAYMENTS BENCHMARKING
SURVEY 2 (2009) [hereinafter TRACE SURVEY].

201. The Inter-American Convention, United Nations Convention, and African
Convention are silent on the issue of facilitation payments, which suggests that they do
not provide an exception for these types of small bribes. See Inter-American Convention,
supra note 33; United Nations Convention, supra note 47; African Convention, supra
note 52. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention appears to be the only foreign bribery
treaty that addresses (and allows for) an exception for "small" facilitation payments
within its provisions. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 6, at cmt. 9.
202. See OECD RECOMMENDATION, supra note 44, at 4.
203.

See OECD, UNITED STATES: PHASE 3, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE

CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 22-24 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf.
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foreign bribery laws.2 °4 Furthermore, most countries, including the
United States,
outlaw facilitation payments under their own domestic
20 5
bribery laws.

In this author's view, companies need to prohibit these payments
even though the FCPA provides an exception for them. The reason for
such prohibition is that facilitation payments are illegal under most of the
domestic and foreign bribery laws in the world.20 6 An international
foreign bribery compliance program needs to include procedures20 7that
prohibit any facilitation payments, no matter how small the amount.
M

Prevent and ProhibitPayments made through Solicitation and
Extortion

Payments involving certain kinds of solicitations, such as the
solicitation for bribes, are illegal under most international anti-bribery
and criminal laws. The same can be said regarding extortion payments.
As a result, a company's compliance program should include procedures
designed to ensure that employees, or third parties acting on the
company's behalf, do not make improper solicitation or extortion
payments.20 8
204. See TRACE SURVEY, supra note 200, at 2. The UK Bribery Act, for example,
outlaws facilitation payments.
205.

See id; Thomas Fox, End of Grease Payments Coming, CORP. COMPLIANCE

Apr. 5, 2010, at 3; Melissa Aguilar, New OECD Stance on Facilitation
Payments, COMPLIANCE WK., Dec. 18, 2009; 18 U.S.C § 201 (2006) (U.S. domestic
bribery statute).
206. See sources cited supra note 205. For an in-depth discussion on the FCPA's
facilitation payments exception, the history behind it, the OECD's recent calls for the end
to facilitation payments, and the need to prohibit the making of such payments as a best
practice in a global anti-bribery environment, see Jon Jordan, supra note 44.
207. See Jordan, supra note 44. Guidance on the relevant foreign bribery procedures
tends to support this recommended procedure. The OECD Good Practice Guidance and
the relevant DOJ non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements do not explicitly
state that a company should prohibit facilitation payments, but they suggest that a
company's compliance program should include compliance procedures designed to
address and govern facilitation payments. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note
7, at 2; Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 12; Tidewater
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at 59, and Alcatel-Lucent Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at 70. The UK GUIDANCE explicitly recognizes
facilitation payments as being illegal under the UK Bribery Act and calls for procedures
designed to address the issue of improper facilitation payments. UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 18, 22. Likewise, the Transparency International guidance calls for
procedures prohibiting facilitation payments. TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES,
supra note 147, at 8.
208. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 8; Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 123, attach. C, at 3; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra
note 122, attach. C, at 2.
INSIGHTS,
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N. Due Diligence and Compliance Requirements Pertainingto the
Retention and Oversight of ThirdPartiesActing on Behalf of the
Company
A company should also institute due diligence and compliance
requirements concerning the retention and oversight of third parties
acting on its behalf, including agents and "intermediaries, consultants,
representatives, distributors, contractors, suppliers, consortia, and joint
venture partners. 2 °9 A company should properly document the due
diligence that is conducted when it hires such third parties. 210 Moreover,
a company should document oversight conducted over third parties after
they have been hired. 211 Finally, a company should inform third parties
acting on its behalf of the company's "commitment" to abiding by
foreign bribery laws and the company's compliance program and obtain
a reciprocal
commitment by the third parties that they will do the
12
same.

0.

2

System of FinancialandAccounting Proceduresand Internal
Controls to Ensure Accurate Books, Records, andAccounts

A company needs to ensure that it has a "system of financial and
accounting procedures, including a system of internal controls,
reasonably designed to ensure the maintenance of fair and accurate
books, records, and accounts, to ensure that they cannot be used for the
purpose of foreign bribery" or hiding such bribery. 2 13 A company should
make sure that its books and records "properly and fairly document all
financial transactions. '2 4 The company should also subject its "internal
control systems, in particular the accounting and recordkeeping practices,

209. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; see also UK GUIDANCE,
supra note 106, at 27-28; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 10-11;

Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 3; Tidewater
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 6-7; Alcatel-Lucent
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 5.
210. See sources cited supra note 209.
211. See sources cited supra note 209.
212. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 3; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 6-7; and Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 5; see also TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS
PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 9-11.
213. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings Non-

Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 4; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 3; see also UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at
22; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147.
214. TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 13.
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provide assurance on their design,
to regular review and audit to ' 215
implementation and effectiveness.
Communication and Trainingon the Compliance Program

P.

A company needs to ensure that all levels of the companyincluding within the company's subsidiaries-have received periodic
communication and training on the compliance program.216 All levels of
the company include officers, directors, and employees of the company,
and, where appropriate, third parties who act on behalf of the
company.217 This training should be documented through annual
showing that relevant training requirements have been
certifications
8
21

met.

Q. DisciplinaryProceduresto Address Violations of the Foreign
Bribery Laws and Compliance Program
A company needs to institute appropriate disciplinary procedures
designed to address violations of the foreign bribery laws and the
company's compliance program. 219 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
also recommend that disciplinary measures be undertaken for failing to
prevent and detect criminal conduct.22 ° Such disciplinary procedures are
necessary to serve as both a deterrent and remedial factor concerning
potential or actual foreign bribery concerns affecting the organization.

215. Id.
216. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 29-30; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 12; FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(4) (2010); Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 4-5; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 4.
217. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 29-30; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS
PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 12; Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra
note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123,
attach. C, at 4-5; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, attach.
C, at 4.
218. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 2; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 4-5; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 4.
219. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3; UK GUIDANCE, supra
note 106, at 22; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 9, 12; FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2. l(b)(7); Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 3; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 123, attach. C, at 6; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra
note 122, attach. C, at 6.
220. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(6).
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Positive Supportfor Observance with the Compliance Program

A company should also institute "appropriate measures to
encourage" and provide positive "support" for the observance of the
compliance program and procedures intended to prevent foreign
bribery.22 1

One of the ways that a company can promote support for
is to provide "appropriate
incentives" to individuals within the company that fully observe the
program.22 2 Although compliance with the program and the foreign
bribery laws should be expected within a company, given the risks
involved in doing otherwise, this procedure calls on a company to
proactively provide positive support and incentives to support and
encourage compliance with the program. 223
observance of the compliance program

S.

Prevent Reoccurrence of Misconduct

The company should "implement procedures to ensure that where
misconduct is discovered, reasonable steps are taken to remedy the harm
resulting from such misconduct" and to ensure that further similar
misconduct never happens again.224
The measure would involve
assessing, and making modifications to, the compliance program after
221
misconduct has occurred to ensure that the program is effective.
T.

Provide Guidance on Compliance Program

The company should establish a system through which it can
provide guidance and advice to officers, directors, employees and, where
appropriate, third parties acting on its behalf, in conformity with the
221. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, app. B, at 1; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, attach. C, at 2; and Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 122, attach. C, at 2.
222. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1 (b)(6).
223. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2; FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(6). With respect to this procedure, FCPA
compliance experts Joseph Murphy and Donna Boehme stress that "[t]he message here is
not that employees should be rewarded for not breaking the law... [r]ather, the focus is
on the compliance program and providing 'positive support' for managers and employees
to show compliance and ethical leadership." Murphy & Boehme, supra note 132, at 271.
Murphy and Boehme note, "This language is consistent with one of the best practice
steps in the field at some leading companies that link compensation to ethical and
compliance leadership criteria." Id.
224. Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 3; Tidewater
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at 62; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at 73; see also FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2. l(b)(7).
225. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(7).
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compliance program.226 Guidance from the company should be available
at all times, including when individuals need "urgent" advice concerning
difficult situations in foreign jurisdictions. 227 A company should have a
compliance official or company counsel available 24 hours per day,
seven days per week, to provide such urgent guidance when needed. 228
In high-risk foreign jurisdictions, reliable local counsel can also be made
available by the company to provide guidance as needed. 229 The
company should also respond to relevant requests for guidance and
undertake further appropriate action as necessary.23 °
U.

Internaland ConfidentialReporting of Suspected or Actual
Violations of the Compliance Program or ForeignBribery Laws

For a compliance program to be effective, a company needs to rely
on individuals within the company, or acting on its behalf, to raise
concerns about suspected or actual violations of the compliance program
or foreign bribery laws.2 3 1 A company should therefore provide an
internal and confidential reporting mechanism for suspected or actual
violations of the compliance program and foreign bribery laws.232 A
company should also protect individuals who report suspected
wrongdoing from potential retaliation.2 33 A company should further
respond to any reports of suspected or actual violations and undertake
whatever appropriate action necessary to address the relevant conduct.23 4

226. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 4; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 12; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 61; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at 72.
227. See sources cited supra note 226.
228. See Murphy & Boehme, supra note 132, at 273.
229. See id.
230. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 13; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 62; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at 73.
231. See TRANSPARENCY BuSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 12.
232. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 4; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 13; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 61; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at 72; see also UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 29; TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 12; FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(5).
233.

See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(5).

234. See OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 4; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 13; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 62; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at 73.
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Monitoring and Review of ComplianceProgram
The company should monitor and conduct periodic reviews and

tests of its compliance program and procedures "to evaluate and improve
their effectiveness in preventing and detecting" violations of the
compliance program and the foreign bribery laws. 235 The purpose of the
monitoring and review is to make sure that the compliance program is
working and to make improvements when necessary. 6 The periodic
reviews and tests should also take into account "relevant developments in
the field, and evolving international and industry standards."2 37 In this

respect, the compliance program and procedures should be evaluated and
changed, if necessary, to adapt to a changing business and legal
environment.2 3 8
W. External Verification of Compliance ProgramEffectiveness

Beyond the periodic monitoring and review of the compliance
program, the company

should obtain external verification of the

compliance program's effectiveness. 239 Having an outside party review
the compliance program periodically is a best practice in the anti-bribery
field that can further assure that a compliance program is working
effectively.2 40 To conduct a truly independent review, the individuals
subject to the review-usually managers overseeing the compliance
241
program-should not be able to influence the review's outcome.
X

Anti-Bribery Provisions in Contractswith Third Parties
A company should include standard provisions in agreements and

contracts with third parties acting on its behalf "that are reasonably

235. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 14; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 63; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at 74; see also UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 31; TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 14; FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 87, § 8B2.1(b)(5)(B), (c).
236. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 31.
237. OECD GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3; Armor Holdings NonProsecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 14; Tidewater Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 123, at 63; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 122, at 74; see also UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 31.
238. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 31.
239. See id.; TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 14.
240. See Murphy & Boehme, supra note 132, at 278.
241. See id.
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calculated to prevent violations" of the foreign bribery laws.242 Such
provisions should include anti-bribery representations and undertakings
relating to compliance with the foreign bribery laws.24 3 The provisions
should also provide the company with the right to conduct audits of the
books and records of the third parties to ensure that such parties are
complying with foreign bribery laws. 244 The provisions should further
provide the company with the right to terminate the third parties when
there has been a violation of the foreign bribery laws or of the antibribery representations and undertakings made with respect to
compliance with the foreign bribery laws.245
Y. Due Diligence of PersonnelOverseeing the Compliance Program
A company should use "reasonable efforts," including exercising
due diligence, to ensure that individuals overseeing the compliance
program have not themselves engaged in illegal activities or conduct
inconsistent with the compliance program.246 A company should not
have unscrupulous or unethical individuals overseeing the program.
Although the ramifications of having such unqualified individuals govern
the compliance program is obvious, the procedure is notable because it is
one of the main procedures recommended in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.247
Z. Due Diligence over PersonnelHired or Postedin Positions
Involving a High Risk for Bribery
A company should conduct due diligence over personnel hired or
posted in positions involving a high risk for bribery. 248 A position may
be considered high risk because its duties involve activities that are more
precarious in nature, such as procuring foreign government contracts.
242. Armor Holdings Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 116, at 13; Tidewater
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123, at 63; Alcatel-Lucent Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at 73-74.
243. See sources cited supra note 242.
244. See sources cited supra note 242.
245. See sources cited supra note 242. These procedures go a step further than due
diligence and compliance requirements pertaining to retention and oversight of outside
parties acting on behalf of the company, as recommended in Part V.N., and are
procedures that have been particularly stressed in recent DOJ non-prosecution and
deferred agreements. Id.; see also supra notes 209-12, and accompanying discussion.
The Transparency International Business Principles recommend similar procedures with
respect to "agents" and "intermediaries." TRANSPARENCY BusINESS PRINCIPLES, supra
note 147, at 11.
246. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 8B2.l(b)(3).
247. See id.
248. See UK GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 28.
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The position may also be high risk because it is located in a country
where bribery is prevalent, such as Somalia. Whichever the case, the
company should conduct due diligence over individuals entering or being
posted in high-risk positions to ensure that such individuals have a clean
record and are qualified to carry out their obligations. The company
should consider incorporating such due diligence into its recruitment and
human resources functions.24 9
VI. CONCLUSION

In the current global anti-bribery era, it is dangerous for companies
to be relaxed or complacent about their foreign bribery compliance
obligations. Countries and regions throughout the world have committed
themselves to combating foreign bribery through treaty obligations such
as the African Convention and the United Nations Convention.
Furthermore, many countries now have laws designed to prosecute
foreign bribery and root out corruption.
Enforcement of the foreign bribery laws has also been more
aggressive. The OECD is pressuring countries to be more vigilant in
enforcement. In addition, the United States is continuing to pursue
companies, both domestically and abroad, that have engaged in foreign
bribery in violation of the FCPA.
Companies need to adapt to the current international anti-bribery
environment and tailor their compliance programs accordingly. The days
when companies can exclusively rely on their FCPA compliance
programs are long gone. There are newer foreign bribery laws, such as
the UK Bribery Act, and greater global enforcement efforts that mandate
companies to have a more expansive view of their compliance
obligations. Furthermore, with the international community providing
recent guidance on compliance, such as through the OECD Good
Practice Guidance, it is possible for companies to implement compliance
programs that meet their international foreign bribery obligations.
Therefore, companies need to consider the international guidance, and
the procedures recommended in this article, and modify their compliance
programs accordingly to make their programs true international foreign
bribery compliance programs.
Companies that do so will find
themselves better protected in a world increasingly hostile to foreign
bribery.

249.

See id

